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 For the past decade, project organization has become increasingly central
to management and organization studies, particularly as these seek to discern the
contours of post-modern organizations. Yet, these contours frequently seem to be
sighted without bearings on the current realities of project management. In this
paper we take such bearings, using data derived from detailed qualitative,
ethnographic enquiry into the experience of project management. From this data 
we construct the contours of project management more sharply. Rather than being 
a harbinger of an autonomous and more democratic future, free from extant
bureaucratic organization controls, we find that project management has distinct
modalities of control that we outline in the paper: reputational, calculative, and
professional. Indeed, rather than foreshadowing a future transformational form,
we find traces of a much older design: that of de Tocqueville.
INTRODUCTION: PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
AS PREFIGURATIVE?
To be a project manager is to assume a responsibility for the management and
accomplishment – the completion – of various projects characterized by finitude,
a specific scope, and, often, contractual particulars. Usually, but not always, these
are commercial projects – they are projects where, above all else, one is expected
to make a difference – creating something such as a bridge, a building, a tunnel,
a discovery, often a profit. There are myriads of such projects and every project
tells many stories. Sometimes these are stories of desires attained, regrets that must
be lived with, dreams accomplished, or nightmares produced: innumerable and
remarkable stories of glory, accomplishment, deceit and punishment, stories that
we have been collecting for some years, slowly building up a sense of the thematic
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relevancies that ring true in mundane stories of ordinary people who happen to
be Project Managers. In this paper we shall introduce two of these people, and
their stories, as emblematic of the tensions involved in being a project manager
today, as we have come to see them.
Recent management theorists have increasingly seen project management in
quite specific terms: as a circuit breaker for bureaucracy, a short cut from the
modern to the postmodern, from bureaucracy and hierarchy to post-bureaucratic
professionalism and collaboration (Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994). Early com-
mentators on ‘new-form organizations’ or ‘postmodern organizations’, such as
Hydebrand (1989) or Clegg (1990) had presumed a connection between the past
of modernity and bureaucracy and the future of a project-based postmodern 
organizational world. At base, their conceptions of post-bureaucracy seemed to
combine elements of an organic structure (Burns and Stalker, 1962) with changed
modalities of control that had shifted to more indirect and internalized forms, as
writers such as Hydebrand (1989, p. 345) and Sewell (1998, p. 408) suggest.
Elements of empowerment and self-reliance formed the basis for an elective 
affinity between project management practice and ideas of post-bureaucracy
centred on unobtrusive peer-based teamwork controls (Barker, 1999; Sewell, 1998;
see also Black and Edwards, 2000; Fairtlough, 1994; Miles and Snow, 1986).
Contemporary managerial discourse and practices for the past decade have been
characterized mainly by the emergence of political and organizational models
that, whatever else they might be, have been opposed to ‘bureaucracy’ as their
‘other’ (Alvesson, 1992; Clegg, 1990; Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994; Kanter
1990). The models define themselves through ‘check lists’ of criteria (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992) as well as through the ideological apparatus they convey (Du Gay,
2000).
Slightly lagged with the emergence of dualistic anti-bureaucratization has 
been another tendency, to go ‘beyond dualisms’ (Reed, 1997) into the analysis 
of ‘hybrids’ such as network forms (Bianchi and Bellini, 1991; Burt, 1992;
Castells, 1996; Chaston, 1995, 1996; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Ebers, 1997;
Häusler et al., 1994; Kogut et al., 1992; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Powell,
1987, 1998; Powell et al., 1996). Hybridity has become fashionable: for instance,
Ackoff (1994) depicts new ‘hybrid political regimes’ composed of ‘democratic 
hierarchy’.
It is easy to see why project management may appear to be a beacon for jaded
organization theory with the promise of a new ‘projectified’ society of organiza-
tional projects (Lundin and Söderholm, 1998). Projects are usually not contained
wholly within bureaucratic corporate hierarchies: they occur in field and labora-
tory settings, outside the formal structuring of organizations, often involving the
coordination of complex networks and inter-organizational relations. Yet, despite
its appeal to postmoderns, project management includes a strong hierarchical
dimension, vertically defining objectives and responsibilities, which serve as an
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instrumental legitimation of project action. Project management draws on a
genealogy that traditionally embodies a ‘well-established pattern of discourse that
has served to privilege the more commercial and pragmatic aims of improved
project coordination and control at the expense of traditional powers and 
autonomy’ (Bresnen, 1996, p. 264). In turn, its core texts, such as Cleland and
King (1968) and Lock (1968), build on ideas that derive from classical theories of
management, such as Fayol (1949).
The professional work of project management draws heavily on the PMI
(Project Management Institute), created in the United States at the end of the
1960s. Professionals, particularly in the management of major projects, gathered
to formulate a management model linked to the logics of organization for each
project. However, it was not until the start of the 1980s that a real panel of spe-
cialists was created: with an ethical code, clearly identified knowledge, and certi-
fication. The aim was to unify project management practices via a unique and
standardizing paradigm. And this standardization led to the definition of criteria
that allowed for the identification and classification of project types. Project man-
agement by this time was being practised in many diverse organizations: from small
businesses that arranged local weddings, meetings, and conventions to major multi-
national corporations. According to the PMI, projects were to be listed according
to the size of the team, the international dimension in the organization, the 
regulatory and professional tradition of the sector of activity, so that expertise
could be standardized around the diversity of its application. Consequently, project
management has been subject to the classical strategy of professionalization as
social closure, in accord with Weber’s (1978) model.
Project management has become organizationally enacted professional work:
because of increased disciplinary training in project management methods by pro-
fessional associations, its organizational division of labour is increasingly based on
a small number of sophisticated methods that aid standardization. There is a move
from past methods of organization, linked to criteria such as tradition and craft,
to disciplinary skills, specializations and standards. Such a strategy for the creation
of a ‘project management’ profession offers commercially independent accredited
sources of legitimacy and power to its practitioners. The professional associations
confer a legitimacy that is quite separate from that of the employing organization.
To the extent that professionalism becomes organizationally legitimate for employ-
ers then the project profession appears to gain status. It offers an alternative source
of career status to that of progression through the hierarchical ranks of bureau-
cratic management while clearly co-existing with these. Some influential reports
on the future of work (http://www.dol.gov/asp/futurework/execsum.pdf ) regard
it as increasingly likely to be constructed on a project basis, as contingent and
staffed by just in time workers. From this perspective, project management is pre-
figurative of the futures that, increasingly, we will be in. Thus, the model behoves
critical scrutiny rather than easy acceptance.
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CRITICALLY SCRUTINIZING PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Superiors nominate project leaders, just as they might a ‘normal’ hierarchical
head. However, they have to work in close proximity, in a team, with those whom
they are appointed to lead. Thus, their legitimacy as project leaders is never simply
given by the fact of their appointment: each project manager has a reserve of legiti-
macy, once appointed, which the estimation of peers and fellow project members
is crucial in maintaining. Ultimately, the fundamental reasons for nomination 
(specific skills, being an ‘inventor/innovator’ behind the idea, or just the sheer 
randomness of opportunity) are less important than the fact that the team mem-
bers will consider the project leader as part of the central governing system of the
organization. Thus, one part of their legitimacy is based on status-hierarchy.
Project managers are not only leaders, however, but are also responsible for the
success of a potentially important mission, given the resources put at their dis-
posal. The project leader, assessed on a capacity to lead a team towards success,
has a certain power over other team members. The success and commitment of
one depends on the success of the other, and visa versa. In the project, nobody
has the right to fail and this pressure to succeed shapes the legitimacy of the project
leader, qualifying the status-hierarchy into a ‘quasi-hierarchical’ role where the 
personal – rather than the task – status is enhanced.
These two key resources, however (organizational nomination, leading to status-
hierarchy, and pressure to succeed, leading to personal status) are also counter-
balanced by certain sources of de-legitimation. The first can be found in the
extreme power that use of the project management form affords classical cor-
porate hierarchies to grant or refuse the resources required for the project. It
creates a form of official dependence, since the project requires resources it is not
capable of supplying itself. The second source lies in the fact that the project leader
is still in most cases part of the hierarchy: the position of project leader can come
up against stable and solid hierarchical structures able to dismiss those who
manage to be recalcitrant. Project managers may be, as most of the managers we
have interviewed were, scientists appointed to the project management position
from a research position, or they may be line managers for whom the success of
their project management will be the determinant of their future line position.
The tension between the personal and the hierarchical means that project
authority becomes based more on interdependence than on hierarchical status.
Consequently, the position of project leader has a tendency to veer towards per-
sonalization, where the ability to communicate, and personify, the pressure to
succeed becomes vital. Yet, simultaneously with this personalization, a project
leader’s authority also has elements of the impersonal because it results from an
organizational nomination. Yet, to the extent that the project takes place at some
remove from the centres of power, out in the capillaries of its micro-systems, then
its personal embodiment will tend to over-determine its legitimate positioning
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within the overall formal networks of power. The degree of perceived proximity
of the project with the centre of the organization, the more or less innovative or
strategic character of the project and the degree of control it is under, even the
person behind the idea that drives the project (often a senior person in the hier-
archy, known as the project sponsor, who lends their legitimacy and positional
power to the project) – all these will have an impact on the intensity and nature
of the authority of the project leader. Balancing this, in situ, in the context of the
project, team members know that, at least for a while, they may be dependent on
the project leader for their personal evaluations. Typically, the locations at which
projects occur are either physically or metaphorically remote from corporate
bureaucracies, whether in field settings such as exploration or construction, inno-
vative ‘skunk-works’, or R&D projects. Work that is done therein is not immedi-
ately visible to superiors distant from the project.
The remoteness of many projects poses particular organizational tensions for
corporate hosts. The challenge is to reconcile the system of project authority with
those structures of power embedded in the corporate body. The exercise of hier-
archical power is far from being structurally linked to clear project systems of legiti-
mized authority. Hierarchical power tends to depend on bureaucratic legitimacy
embedded in routines and rules while project authority typically requires creativ-
ity and innovation in the accomplishment of objectives, rather than adherence to
strict rules. Besides, as experienced project managers know, such strict rules are
merely resources for creativity and innovation in their interpretation and negoti-
ation (Clegg, 1975). Hence, external regulation meets project governmentality in
a highly personalized bureaucracy.
Framed in between the desiderata of externally imposed regulation and inter-
subjectively shared governmentality, project management creates and imposes
codes while at the same time it organizes and makes formal a number of nego-
tiable exceptional possibilities (concerning deadlines, for example). It is based on
a number of written supports, whose aim is formally to state the required actions,
yet it must always leave room for innovation and creativity, disciplined by govern-
mental norms. Thus, project management can be considered a hybrid between
the centralised enactment of rules and procedures and a capacity to create the
future. That this is the case can best be seen in the ‘intimate histories’ (Zeldin,
1995) of project management that we have been collecting for many years. From
such short stories we build our theory.
BUILDING THEORY FROM SHORT STORIES:
MEETING HENRI AND MICHEL
As researchers, we have collected data on project careers; on who wins and loses,
using what strategies and rationalities, in real contexts and situations. Such stories
often start from small things close at hand to the individuals, focusing on detailed
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descriptions and accounts of everyday experience. What we search for are
accounts of practical, bounded, situational rationality. In the small pearls of every-
day experience we see dialogical themes for social science to engage with. Thus,
it matters not that the sample of stories that we retell and retail are small – the
human comedy is an infinity of stories – but how their themes illuminate signifi-
cant tensions, themes, and paradoxes of this condition of human agency within
structural conditions, themes and paradoxes that we have become sensitized to
over many years of exposure to such stories, on two continents.
To interpret stories of project management politically requires one to interpret
the experience of those behind it, the teams and their activities. In other words,
over and above interpreting individual biographies as personal work-stories, one
should attempt to understand these in a context in which personal troubles assume
a more public dimension. (Brusoni et al. (2001) make a similar point in their dis-
cussion of the relation between power and knowledge in innovative project teams
concerned with aircraft engine control systems.) Long, often intriguing, interviews
have peppered our research into the political aspect of projects. In our interviews
we have investigated the reasons why a manager leads or enters into a project. We
wanted to explore what they understand the firm expects in nominating them for
such responsibility. To try and provide some flavour of the stories we draw on two
in particular – those of Henri and Michel – two French project managers, who
provide two very different subjective views in response to a simple question: ‘Why
did you become a project manager?’[1]
The open-ended approach to interviewing was designed to generate rich
accounts of the experience of the managers (Alvesson, 1996) where these accounts
are treated as compelling narratives rather than reports of reality (Silverman,
1993). This interviewing practice thus created a site where the managers could
‘construct a personal narrative through a storytelling performance’ (Rhodes, 2001,
p. 38). Of course, we cannot absent ourselves as researchers from the character of
these stories or from the parts of them that we have chosen to recount in this paper.
Like any story-based research, the story recounted is ‘still interactive and guided
by recipient/researcher responses to the storyteller’s contextually guided percep-
tion of what the researcher will find interesting and “story-worthy” ’ (ibid, p. 39).
In writing up these stories we therefore do not take them to be merely accurate 
or distorted accounts of the participants’ reality but rather see them as inter-
subjectively produced texts that embody a dialogue between their experience and
our research interests. The result is a story of project management informed 
by the reflexive generation of accounts, represented in the intersection of the
researchers experience and interpretative approaches and the stories that we
encountered.[2]
The stories we represent are strategic choices on our part. We have deliberately
sought cases of project management that are as favourable as possible to the thesis
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that projects represent the emergence of a new form, different from bureaucracy.
In this respect, we use a critical case approach (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 78), choosing
stories that have a strategic importance in relation to the general problem area 
of projects as a prefiguration of future organization forms. Thus, we have 
sampled from innovation projects rather than construction cases (which we 
have used elsewhere); we have chosen projects that were remote from Corporate
HQs, and, with the story of Henri, we are able to gain an insight into a long 
duration of project experience and its changing contours. Hence, we chose 
cases that were most likely to support the prefigurative new organizational form
argument.
The analysis that we present is thematic (Boje, 2001), moving between etic and
emic levels of analysis, in a search for patterns (Spradley, 1980) in projects. We
have selected the biographies of project managers as the domain for analysis and
sought to create an inventory of contrasts between projects experienced in the past
compared with present day conditions. From this inventory we identified key
themes around the concept of control. Our interest in control was theoretically
derived from the confluence of our interests in bureaucracy and domination
(Clegg, 1981, 1975; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Courpasson, 2000a) and so was
not entirely inductive. Thus, although we were looking in the tales of these project
managers for themes we have encountered in our past professional work we should
stress that these themes were also inductively there in the data: we are not ‘pure’
constructivists.
Henri is a new processes project manager for a large company in the food-
processing industry. His tale recounts the gradual apprenticeship of a manager
who, little by little, began to understand project management in terms of control,
a system in which all autonomy is rigidly supervised by the imposed instructions.
Henri was 52 in August 1998 when we met him over a period of two weeks to
hear him talk about his career as a project manager. Henri was initially attracted
to project managing because he saw himself as a ‘man of action’, as someone who
could get things done, who could leave his personal and material stamp on the
world. Henri is a doer rather more than a thinker, a successful man boxed in by
the circumstances of his own history. He related an old-style approach to project
management as well as providing us with a vision of the changes that occurred
since the beginning of his career. Our second story concerns Michel, a research
scientist. He describes his job as one ‘noted for its slow progress’. His experience
with project management illuminated the bureaucratic element of this manage-
ment tool and the constraints and limits it can impose on those most resistant to
control. When we spent half a day with Michel in September 1998 to discuss his
position as research scientist and project leader in the field of plant resistance to
herbicides, he was in his early-thirties. Michel did a Doctoral Thesis in molecular
biology and was then hired by his present firm. His career has been fairly straight-
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forward but he feels that the role of project leader is increasingly incompatible
with that of a researcher, an anxiety that led him to speculate about his future.
Henri: Autonomy, Intermediation and Power
Henri was initially employed in peripheral sites and was able to be relatively
autonomous in selecting and leading project teams. For around 30 years, Henri
experienced an increase in the bureaucratization of complex industrial project
management and the centralisation of decision-making units for all aspects of the
projects he was responsible for: technical, managerial, and human. In learning to
be a project manager Henri learnt also to become an intermediary: ‘A lot
depended on feeling and how we got on with the others’, he said of those early
days when he first learned the project manager’s task. Later, when he gained the
job that he had when we met him, it was these intermediary skills that were vital.
‘Overall, having accepted this job has proven that most of what I learnt 
technically during my previous jobs was not the most important in the eyes of the
directors. What I mean is that by nominating me project director they hoped to
benefit from my 15 years of management and control experience. That was what
they wanted, that I was used to working with mixed teams, power struggles, in
other words, intermediate and uncomfortable positions.’ As he says later in 
his conversation, he had learnt to control and to be controlled, to be an 
intermediary.
There is an honourable and historically complex history to the role of inter-
mediary, as Zeldin (1995, pp. 154–64) explains. Intermediaries, such as project
managers, are like catalysts – they need other intermediaries to set them off. They
need mixed teams, finances, plans, and bureaucracies in the background that
deliver the goods – literally. Being an intermediary historically has involved
a series of minute interactions in the presence of others. It means that force is
no longer in total command. It means that the humble or the timid can con-
tribute to great adventures without being too concerned who is superior to
whom: a minute ingredient can have as much effect as a large one. Inter-
mediaries inject an element of the unexpected into human affairs, which can
have negative as well as stimulating results; and they are always tempted to
demand too high a price for their efforts. But they flourish when they please all
parties equally, when they oppress nobody. (Zeldin, 1995, p. 161)
Project managers as intermediaries perform dual roles in organizations: they bring
categories together but they also keep them apart, as Bloomfield and Vurdubakis
(1997) suggest. Being a project manager is as much to do with people and the politi-
cal relations involved in managing them and with financial – rather than engi-
neering – techniques. As political intermediaries project managers seek to mobilize
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different people, systems and things in pursuit of what these others can be con-
structed as seeing as ‘common goals’.
Henri manages power in two distinct and positive ways. For him, power is not
a negation of the power of others but a positive force that enables others to achieve
things. One set of others that he manages is site workers. He said little about these
directly, but we can assume that a measure of his success in this regard is that
nothing needs to be said: the relations are not antagonistic and conflictual and
thus do not warrant comment. Anyway, there is no need for them to be – they are
managed by formal documents that circulate everywhere they are required so that
those who exercise surveillance know in what terms they do it. ‘Only formal docu-
ments are sent, but that is their strength, the respect of the rules and regulations
which in turn allows all those involved in the project to meet in committees and
to know the position of things.’ When procedural rationality frames the truth of
projects then people listen to its terms and debate flows within its parameters of
normalcy – its modes of rationality. It is in this way that Henri self-manages the
power that manages him. This is the power of numbers, of rationality, of finances,
‘to be supervised when working on high-stake financial projects, where mistakes
are out of the question.’ As he goes on to say, ‘Autonomy exists if you can fulfil
your duties; you lose it if you make a false move.’
Henri’s career path has not been easy: he sought willingly to learn more about
the role of industrial project manager, only to be excluded for two main reasons.
First, because of his age; second, because of the gap between hands-on manage-
ment and the formal management systems he had to obey for eight years. The
price paid was to sacrifice any attempts at innovation that arose during this time.
This is important since it suggests, as a hypothesis, that the increasing systemiza-
tion and cost-control of project management led Henri to abandon innovation. In
other words, the company directors prefer project leaders who concentrate on the
rules and their objectives at the outset of any project. Leaders are not encouraged
to propose better but more costly solutions than those that are already in place to
the strategy committee. This is a sure sign of bureaucratization, of strengthening
rules and existing methods to prevent any personal initiative that might risk desta-
bilization of the plan. The rule in the company is clear: continue working on what
has proven to be successful for new production sites in the past and avoid wasting
time studying expensive new possibilities whose outcome is uncertain. Bureaucracy
comes into play whenever management constraints mean excluding what could be
considered more adventurous paths, where the results are uncertain.
In such cases project management is the fusion of bureaucracy with indeter-
minacy. Companies use bureaucracy to codify and provide procedures, to accom-
pany individual and group action. Such action is necessary for the project to make
ground as well as to assess the level of success of the solutions implemented at the
end of the project, and decide whether or not to use them again for future 
projects. In this light, the project becomes a tool for standardization but its 
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achievement is always contingent on ‘imagination’ and ‘new techniques’ – which
must not fail. Thus, ‘the trend today is to find the perfectly organized and 
structured person’.
Michel: Compromising Between Ethics and Pragmatics
For Michel, things are quite similar, even if interpreted in a quite different way,
and capable of being expressed more economically. His story is based on the search
for a compromise between strong ethical values as a scientist and the necessary
pragmatism of a manager. Michel’s career shows how difficult it is to resist the
powerful constraints of project management. This second story is that of a clamp
slowly suffocating an ambition ultimately judged incompatible with the concerns
of the decision-makers whose job is to supervise Michel’s project.
When a scientist considers project management a necessary step towards pro-
motion a highly specific aspect of its political power is revealed. But, with such a
promotion something happens to self-respect: scientifically, one loses it with no
gain as a scientist-manager, except as a manager of milestones, deadlines, targets,
and suchlike. As an emissary in a complex web, Michel has lost respect for himself
as a scientist but found no power as a manager. He did not expect it to be that
way: ‘at the beginning I thought it was all very positive, that I would benefit from
all the advantages of being a scientist without the negative points of being a
leader’.
In Michel’s story we see project management becoming a managerial institu-
tion – a system which is both useful and efficient and which seeks to generate its
own legitimacy. Project management legitimacy can be considered a tool of gov-
ernmentality in Michel’s case; the project is vital if he wants to progress hierar-
chically and it is this fact that forces him to accept the conditions imposed by his
superiors. It is not important in itself but in the political relationship it creates
between individuals and an organization. It generates a situation where individu-
als are supervised, penalised or rewarded, selected, etc. It creates efficient and
effective relays of power while it steals scientific self-respect: ‘they put us under
pressure to go faster and faster. In the biotech field, the stakes are enormous, and
the biggest change to date is that every day you hear ‘where are you at now?’
Michel had to abandon scientific ways of working when he became a project
manager and had to adopt centralized tools of governance. Michel quickly dis-
covered that decision-making power was held in the hands of the corporate hier-
archy. He has become a managerial delegate, deigned to intermediate between the
world of commerce and the world of nature. He doesn’t really think of himself
as a project ‘leader’. As a scientist he experienced project management as a dis-
possession of disciplinary control. More precisely, our scientist accepts being
severely and regularly supervised by a number of committees; he believes not only
that he has no choice other than to submit but also that this control may enable
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his disciplinary knowledge to succeed in the organization. Michel’s experience
would suggest that project management can be experienced as a process in which
one has to give up something – respect based on disciplinary knowledge – and
become pragmatic. What is given up is a scientific dream considered too costly
and uncertain. ‘That’s over now – the best way is the shortest way’.
Discussion of Henri’s and Michel’s Stories
Henri and Michel are typical of the many project managers we have encountered.
Their professionalism is based less on the autonomy of leading project research
so much as the will of corporate bodies. The mechanism is simple and relatively
classical. It distils, essentially, to two principles. The first is the construction and
acknowledgment of a model of required skills for successful project management.
This model is mainly based on the ability to read, interpret and finally apply rules
and procedures related to the project management system. Such elements are
based on the choice of persons who have a rigorous managerial profile and also
a ‘regulatory’ profile, in other words, who respect the ‘rules’, and will, in turn,
impose these rules on others, or at least cultivate obeisance and respect towards
them as a normative ethos. Those responsible for leading and governing innova-
tion processes must base their actions on ethics that respect the quality and effi-
cacy of procedures. A rule-guided context becomes a resource in decision-making
processes and a protective system in case of contestation.
The second principle guiding the production of professional project manage-
ment is that of situational and concentrated testing practices. The systems for the
detection and steering of future project directors are based on tests, over relatively
short periods, for easy assessment of individual efficacy. The project is clearly an
obvious choice for this form of test: there is a concentration in time, and a clear
situation (precise objectives, timing, evaluation sequences, a clearly defined team)
that makes easier any judgement and decisions concerning the ‘potential’. The
elite is then selected according to the ability to meet the primary requirement of
a ‘good’ project director: managerial rigour and ethics. They will also understand
the meanings of urgency and deadlines: take the fastest, shortest route, without
worrying too much about the perfection of the modalities and, especially, the
human costs involved. To that extent, project management may also be conceived
as a managerial selection instrument, simultaneously enabling the control of
outputs and behaviours as it seeks to drive selection of the ‘best employees’
(Fincham, 1992; Ray, 1986), ‘reflecting the subjective face of selection’ (Fincham,
1992, p. 752). The subjective face demonstrates how those in positions of power
to choose people do so in ways that legitimize their selection by showing that they
‘know what they mean by the vague terms – natural leadership, soundness, judge-
ment, character – that they employ’ (Fincham, 1992, p. 755). Essentially, the best
employees will be people for whom project management has become both a
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science of control and an instrument of subordination. The project managers as
a specific group of experts elaborate hybrid forms of governance, situated between
a scientific-entrepreneurial adventure and managerial pragmatism/cynicism.
They act to some extent less as relatively independent and more as ‘servants of
domination’, in terms similar to those foreshadowed by de Tocqueville (1961;
1996, p. 418).
MODALITIES OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONTROL
The stories of project management represent it as a heterogeneous control system,
covering several modalities, which generate distinct project tensions. We shall now
distil these from the stories collected above. Typologies of such control are 
familiar in organization theory: one thinks of Edwards’ (1979) typologies of how
management controls manufacturing employees; however, here we are concerned
not with these archetypes of the shifting frontier of industrial control in the
trenches of industrial class struggle, but how responsible, autonomous project
managers are controlled remotely (see also Friedman, 1977). The first, which seems
obvious in the history of projects, is reputational control.
Reputational Control
Reputational control is both hierarchically- and peer-based. Hierarchically, the
project is an extremely powerful disciplinary system: it permits the creation of
almost permanent real-life tests of skill in a decentralized supervisory milieu 
authorized by the spatio-temporal concentration of each project and its daily 
interdependencies. In peer terms, reputational control also occurs via the critical
tests of communication that inevitably occur within teams each day: the decen-
tralization of control is therefore a means for building a management system based
on the affirmative and positive autonomy of teams.
Such strategies of reputational control produce tensions as well as affirmation.
The tension generated in the critical periods of projects is a powerful and legiti-
mate means for observing how individuals behave when confronted by difficulties
that affect both the whole team and individual members alike. Collaboration is
therefore tested daily, which rapidly creates individual reputations. One’s reputa-
tion, as a project manager, is always on the line, open to widespread inspection,
both from those whom one reports to as well as those who report to one. How one
handles the uncertainties and challenges that transpire as the project unfolds 
are evident in the reports one files as well as in the frequent project meetings one
fronts.
One particular tension is vested in superordinate/subordinate relations. Because of
the frequent turnover of projects and the consequent depth of diverse project
experiences that members accumulate, they have considerable informal learning
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at their disposal, expressed in sharp and sometimes acerbic daily expressions 
of the worth of the current project, its management and relations. From such 
experience comes tension for the managers of projects that do not live up to the
expectations of experienced team members, even as the project is being repre-
sented in functional terms to those in the corporate hierarchy. Resistance to project
management is readily built on this basis, as knowledgeable members, able to
exploit knowledge gleaned through their own mobility and migration between pro-
jects, spread the reputational word on the adequacy of the project managers. In
this respect, Henri is an exemplary manager of these tensions – because of his
excellence as an intermediary.
Calculative Control
Practices such as administrative accounting systems and calculative instruments
that monitor performance increasingly become instruments of power (Armstrong,
1989; Miller and O’Leary, 1987). Versions of ‘corporate culturism’, in Willmott’s
terms (1993), legitimize the constraints imposed by managerial control (Fincham,
1992), sometimes, as Clegg et al. (2002) suggest, creating new codes and a new
ethos of governmentality. Making project management action increasingly proce-
durally based, corporate management uses such techniques to assess actions,
critical events, decisions, and reasons behind decisions, as carefully as possible,
creating the contemporary figure of an ‘accountable [project] manager’
(McSweeney, 1994). Such project managers report to corporate bodies in terms of
cost and quantity controls. Those working on projects understand such control
procedures to be a way of knowing what results have been obtained via which
mechanisms. Innovation policies can suffer under these controls. There is a dis-
tance between a ‘pure’ logic of control found in the external requirements for
upwards reporting that project managers work under, based on systematic and sit-
uational ‘audits’ of performance (Power, 1990), and the logic of improving actions
that a ‘less pure’ concertive control (Barker, 1993) allows for inside the project.
Steering in the name of efficiency produces increased external control of innova-
tive action. Managing in the name of innovation produces increased emphasis 
on concertive learning and adjustment within the project. Thus, external calcula-
tive controls impose a managed rather more than a mutual learning process: inno-
vation is surrendered to reporting routines and creativity may suffer, as Michel
documents: for him, becoming a project manager has meant losing his identity as
a scientist.
In project management the aim of external calculative control over the project
is to ‘gain enough known-how to reduce the impact of a potential surprise’
(Landau and Stout, 1979). Usually, these aspects of control are based almost
entirely on the search for and assessment of efficiency in managing the project.
Judgements depend on the search for precise information on the project; if this
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information does not fit efficiency models, then, typically, the possibility of trans-
formation of the mechanisms and working methods of project teams is raised as
a way to reassert control. The best example of this is the often-sudden change in
authority of the project leader. This can be explained by the systematic search for
facts and figures. The hierarchical control of projects basically seeks to check that
the objectives fixed at the outset have been respected. If the project manager has
successfully integrated this notion of checking, he/she knows their task is to alert
the governing bodies as early as possible to warn them that the objectives will not
be reached, thus allowing for an adjustment in the objectives before assessment.
If they do not do this they cannot argue that the objectives were unrealistic or
poorly thought up. The power of the project leader to so argue resides in clear
knowledge of rules and procedures, an ability to anticipate discrepancies, and to
fix meetings with the governing bodies. Seen from this angle, traditional project
management is a long way from liberal models of entrepreneurial governance.
Instead, it promotes a new bureaucratic model, one that benefits from personal-
ized respect for the rules and ability in their indexical enactment, and a strict
regime of upward and external reporting.
Project managers are intermediaries between a rule-governed organizational
body and local rationalities. Project management is a system for controlling costs
and achieving objectives. Control procedures are pervasively and powerfully
embedded into the regular and efficient reporting of actions and decisions made.
Reporting is essential to the project objectives and is considered by the governing
bodies an indication of the successful operation of the project.
The professional managerial figures that create reports responding to calcula-
tive controls are clearly distant from those situated in the entrepreneurial model
depicted by some ‘revolutionaries’ (Peters, 1987; for a critique of which, see du
Gay, 2000). The project managers have to understand organizational constraints
and purposes to be able to transform the work of project imagination into 
organizational exemplification. To do so is not a question of technical expertise
or creative abilities alone – it is a matter of being more bureaucratic than the
bureaucrats, of going beyond the rules, of being able politically to communicate
these to all the different project actors. (Bauman (1999) explores how the ethical
implications of such everyday zealousness can be devastating in other contexts.)
Intermediate experts who become experts at calculating in terms of external con-
trols, such as project managers, create bureaucracy as an artificial distance between
persons and organizations (Kallinikos, 2001). Tensions between representation and
that which is represented are embedded in such calculation. The panoptical
requirements of project reporting require making visible through figures that
which has transpired, which frequently leads to representation strategies that gloss
local action and activity to those at a distance. Not to put too fine a point on it,
they can sometimes lead to ‘Cooking the Books’ (Clegg, 1975). The onus to report
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at regular, routine and fixed intervals can be extremely demanding of project man-
agement performance in the short term. In such a context the project manager
may think it better to gloss favourably, with the ambition of the project recover-
ing lost ground, due to the very bureaucratic professionalism of the project man-
agers involved. For Michel, as we have reported, the project is vital if he wants to
succeed in his career and, to do so, he must accept conditions imposed by his 
superiors, he must seek to be seen to be successful in these terms, even if this 
means sometimes, cutting some representational corners.
Professional Control
The professional constitution of the group of project managers and its modality is
expressed in tensions surrounding collegial professional relations. Project managers
watch not only their projects and staff (who in turn watch the project managers
and the projects, as we have suggested). They also exercise surveillance over each
other and observe one another. A kind of reticular professional supervision is
created. Each project is new, so gradually the project managers shape the rules
under the tutelage of those project members whose instantiation brings the rules
into concrete existence. Progressively, project leaders rapidly normalize practice-
based expertise models.
The tension generated here is that while such action creates new resources of
legitimation for the rest of the organization it also creates a professional project
for project management. Host organizations sometimes consider such develop-
ments negatively because of the way they create links between the construction of
a group of competitors and the knowledge-management strategies of key organi-
zational positions. The tension resides in the imposition of a model of organiza-
tional proprietary knowledge in terms of ownership and control, rather than the
construction of a parallel model of competence, based on professional project
experience.
From the corporate organizational perspective, project management entails a
high degree of extra-technical and extra-scientific activities, and both project
leaders and employing organizations can become ambivalent about claims for
endogenous professional control. Professional control can represent a supervisory
resource, as it can supply project leaders with arguments, at specific times, to push,
constrain, or request members to comply in some way, with the support of the
corporate organization host. The control of projects is therefore highly ambiva-
lent, representing both a resource and a constraint. Where project leaders accept
such control it tends to be because it helps them, thanks to its formal nature, in
communicating decisions, demands and obligations. The technological forms of
project control also generate a demand for efficiency. Project management is a
control system that allows those involved to account for their acts, to judge and
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assess them. Control is both an assessment of actions and decisions and also as a
form of awareness of these. The project manager’s regular reports to superiors
justify both objectives and awareness.
Project management involves the rationalization of choices. The strength of the
corporate control system in project management depends on the ability to elimi-
nate arbitrary decisions at the periphery so as to overawe arbitrary decisions at the
centre. Supervising a given project involves being responsible for information
content and accuracy on the part of corporate managers. For instance, when they
receive negative feedback they have to decide whether to continue with the project,
which means they have to continue investing, or they may decide to cut the project
– and their losses: the implications of which can generate an insuperable tension
for project managers. As project managers, both their two key resources of
organizational nomination (ranking of them in the status-hierarchy), and the peer
pressure to succeed (ranking them in terms of personal status), are hostage to such
routinized judgements. While Michel is more vulnerable to the former, Henri is
undoubtedly hostage to the latter, as an intermediary par excellence.
BACK TO THE FUTURE?
Modalities of control – reputational, calculative and professional – structure the
general organizational contexts within which project managers work, which we
have illuminated through our two intimate stories. The question that we started
with was to what extent these modalities prefigure some new hybrid, post-
bureaucratic form of project organization? To answer this question we turn con-
sideration of the management of projects back to a much older, and classical,
concern with the conditions constituting political action.
de Tocqueville was one of the major thinkers of centralization and political
regimes and his views seem entirely appropriate to interpret project organizations
as centralized forms of governance. Such centralization is legitimized and sus-
tained by specific capillary power practices, which we term ‘soft despotism’, prac-
tices that recall the kind of post-democratic evolution de Tocqueville (1996)
describes in De la démocratie en Amérique. From a Tocquevillean perspective one can
understand the impressive diffusion of the project form throughout organizations
and countries, in a way that counterbalances orthodox neo-institutionalist points
of view, with their stress on institutional isomorphism.
On Centralization
For students of power, project management’s modalities of control and governance
are based on major political features early foreshadowed in discussion of the con-
stitutional basis of modernity, seen as a direct evolutionary consequence of demo-
cratic societies. de Tocqueville argued that for centralization to be realized as an
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effective form of governance, two features are required: specific professions whose
duty is to control order and subordinate behaviours and homogeneous rules
through which to do so. Central power is all the stronger and durable in so far as
it stands at a distance, remote from all the detailed events occurring in a complex
society (de Tocqueville, 1996, p. 405). Furthermore, centralized power is especially
appropriate in conditions of extreme uncertainty, where urgency and rapidity are
requested to cope with external difficulties (de Tocqueville, 1996, pp. 411–12).
Project organizations have been part of a prodigious movement towards the
sophistication of administrative science and procedures since the beginning of the
century: through such administrative apparatuses, business leaders achieve things
more rapidly, at less cost, with greater order and coherence. They do so through
intermediary managers controlled by the capillarity of managerial procedures and
networks rather than through personalized direct control. As Michaud and Thoenig
(2000) point out, ‘in the jungle of decentralization, integration is guaranteed only
by the centre which, as a financial holding, exerts pressure and structures its domi-
nation through two key mechanisms: the appointment of leaders for each unit and
the defining of short term performance criteria’ (Michaud and Thoenig, 2000, p.
70; our translation). Additionally, there is also the control of capital allocation.
Project managers are the appointed leaders whom governing bodies manage and
judge at the same time, through short-term performance criteria – the basis of a
political regime called despotism, in de Tocqueville’s (1996) terms. Project man-
agement materializes ‘the instinct of centralization’ and can be considered (as can
bureaucratic forms as a whole) both by business leaders and by organizational
members as one of the ‘only immobile point in the middle of the singular mobility
of their existences and thoughts’ (de Tocqueville, 1996, p. 428; our translation).
On Soft Despotism
The most crucial paradox in politics, as de Tocqueville (1996) saw it, was between
resistance and submission, between political action and political obedience (Cour-
passon, 2000b, p. 284). The Tocquevillean paradox leads to a singular conclusion
about modern organizations, quite different from Willmott’s (1993) characteriza-
tion of them as totalitarian. Instead, we see them as characterized by soft despo-
tism, ‘degrading people without worrying them’ (de Tocqueville, 1996, p. 432; our
translation). The governmentality of soft despotism is based on recognition of an
intermediation between the political centralization of authority and the sover-
eignty of ‘free subjects’. It is the ambiguous marriage between the decentraliza-
tion of a certain amount of discretion (to be accountable and responsible for one’s
actions and decisions) and the pre-eminence of a central power, distributed to 
multiple ‘servants’ selected by those in power, thanks to specific administrative 
procedures designed to produce a creative compliance (such as systems linking
potential reward to risk within project management: see Clegg et al., 2002). Soft
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despotism is characterized in project management by the administration of rules
that give managerial discretion to project managers and their counterparts (such
as business unit managers, for instance). But this discretion does not diminish the
central power of governing bodies; on the contrary, it strengthens it, because 
the people accepting responsibility for these projects are chosen in line with the
rationale of governing bodies. They know that their obligation is to act creatively
within systems designed by these governors (Courpasson, 2000b).
In projectified organizations governing bodies give day-to-day administrative
discretion to project managers. In so doing they create an endogenous political
regime, compared to bureaucracies, that enhances operational project autonomy,
job discretion and control. Governing bodies create adequate and legitimate
control rules, which are fed by fear and clear and credible threats. A major sub-
jective fear is that of being taken off the project before completion or not being
appointed to another one afterwards; additionally, as a project member, irrespec-
tive of being a project manager, there is the shared threat of being powerless and
in danger because of external pressures and uncertainties. Ultimately, the politi-
cal concentration of power in the hands of a minority, combined with the regular
use of credible threats hanging over people – the classical definition of despotism,
according to Montesquieu (1973, pp. 31–2) – is what sustains project management.
It should be apparent that the hybrid forms of control of project management
are founded on the refurbishment of bureaucratic procedures rather than their
renunciation. They rely on the clever distribution and spread of control rather
than its democratization or negation. The project profession we have analysed is
trapped in the duty of compliance it owes to governing bodies, because the latter
have selected and elaborated the conditions and criteria for the existence and 
legitimacy of the profession. Project managers, by pragmatically devoting their
abilities to the destiny of their own project, effectively renounce any will to govern
collective bodies. Their identities are tied up, literally, with their projects.
Are such project organizations an effective prefiguration of post-bureaucratic
organization, saturated by diffuse democratic feelings, according to which 
everyone should be ‘empowered’ and ‘businessed’ (Peters, 1994)? Not if the 
Tocquevillean auspices of our analysis are correct. Instead, project management
is a powerful hybrid despotism developing pervasively, based on the appearance
of equality in the project team and the reality of a pervasive system of govern-
mental controls. For de Tocqueville, such a mode of governmentality manages the
mass through ‘an immense and tutelary power, responsible for their pleasures and
fates. It is total, precise, regular, caring and gentle . . . thus, day after day, it reduces
the need for, and the use of, a free-will’ (de Tocqueville, 1961; 1996, pp. 432, 442;
our translation). Tocquevillean democracy was founded on constraints – the idea
of a collectively shared commitment to simultaneously respect individual freedom
and personal responsibility (March and Olsen, 1995, pp. 2–3; Mill, 1956), which
may be strengthened by the political centralization of power: ‘equality produces
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indeed two trends; the one leads people directly to an independence and may push
them suddenly to anarchy, the other leads them through a larger, more secret but
more sure way, to servitude’ (de Tocqueville, 2001, p. 396; our translation). Con-
trary to contemporary discourses on organizational democracy, de Tocqueville
suggests that stability and permanence come from centralized authority imposing
rules on people. The individualization of management, enhancing and rewarding
mobility, flexibility, the abolition of frontiers, and the resulting banishment of
bureaucracy (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997), is thus similar to the power of govern-
ing bodies – the political hybridization that projectified organizations may induce.
DIFFUSING PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The way in which similar organizational forms are diffused and sedimented across
organizations is fundamental because it is only through their pervasiveness that these
forms can result in specific (eventually hybrid) political regimes. This is an issue
mostly analysed by neo-institutionalism (Fligstein, 1985). In this approach, some
organizations are leaders in playing a central role in the stratification and diffusion
of new forms. What about specific managerial technologies, such as project man-
agement? Project management has achieved remarkable visibility through a process
of ‘subjectification’ that constructs ‘recognizable and recurrent social and organi-
zational roles’ (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 701). Amongst these are the
codification and rationalization of different beliefs and practices, stabilized in a
general managerial technology called project management.
We consider our ‘internal and subjective’ approach complementary to neo-
institutionalist approaches to organizational sedimentation; we have not investi-
gated the patterns of diffusion of project management but the way in which actors
are constituted in relation to specific modes of control. For, in a Tocquevillean way,
it is through this constitution that specific organizational and political regimes may
be produced and sustained. In this paper, these regimes are conceived as forms
and practices of governance that are objectified and embodied in specific opera-
tional, administrative and managerial systems, such as project management.
Through the analysis of small stories, we see how specific rules of conduct, per-
formance principles and devices of control, have been developed and, at the same
time, how they have produced new types of actors within organizations.
The strength of project management that allows it to be diffused widely is that
it is highly reproducible. It is a totality of well-defined rules and procedures consti-
tuting a specific managerial package. It also displays the character of durability,
because it is based upon a technology of writing, planning, budgeting and account-
ing (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). Because it is well understood and conveyed
from one firm to one another, it constitutes in itself a process of rationalization that
uses established significations, meanings, cognitions, and criteria to compensate for
the complexity of social games and of individual interests. It enables the decon-
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textualization of control and renders its harsh face in ways more acceptable to
individuals – it offers soft domination within the project as it is intermediated by
the project managers. Project management is a hybrid form in so far as its insti-
tutionalization is concerned: it stands between more highly codified systems, such
as a computer application, and less codified systems, such as TQM, being 
both more finite in any of its particulars but also more easily communicable 
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 711).
Our stories show how specific actors institutionalize project management tech-
nologies internally. They demonstrate that people not only carry this institution-
alization but, in doing so, exercise an active complicity with governing bodies. That
is why project management appears to be a governmental technology that depends
on the subjectivity of its protagonists for its objectification. A pervasive feeling 
of equality exists within contemporary project teams in contemporary business
organizations. We have argued that these feelings are governed through a politi-
cal hybridization of bureaucratic principles (the external controlling part of these
managerial technologies) with democratic principles (the internal deliberative part
of these technologies). A central place is given to the actors constituted through
these technologies, to their feelings, and the way they see their future. Bureaucracy
becomes governmentally neo-liberal when it harnesses individual feelings to
embody and institutionalize the central rules and tools required to govern collec-
tive and individual fates. No longer experienced just as external and coercive
necessity, the rules become part of the project of projects at the actor level. These
modalities of control are based on major political features that were early fore-
shadowed in discussion of the constitutional political basis of modernity. Project
management practices, compared with the rule-tropism of bureaucracy, are
increasingly sophisticated thanks to the pervasiveness of principles and control
norms and the diffusion of pragmatic/cynical conduct within organizational
members (Courpasson and Dany, 2001; Parker, 1998). Because project staffing is
permanently transforming, evolving, moving, changing, only the durability of gov-
erning authoritative bodies is the guarantor of a relatively stable political regime.
While the individualization of project managers enhances and rewards mobility,
flexibility, and shifting of the frontiers of bureaucracy (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997)
upwards and out, it creates only the appearance of a form that is post-modern,
post-bureaucratic. Instead of the rules being there, pervasively so, and in a causal
relation to the action that ensues, they are instead internalized in the disciplines
of the project managers and communicated in relatively non-distorted forms of
communication within the project.
CONCLUSION
The project is a managerial institution comprised of a number of controls and
procedures. Simultaneously, it centralizes innovative ideas and shifts a culture of
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individual knowledge ownership to organizational ownership. In a way, innova-
tion becomes a matter for the organization rather than the individual scientist or
engineer. Empirical findings concerning project management, teamwork, the 
delegation of responsibilities, and of course, bureaucratization, demonstrate that
project management does not entail the abolishment of hierarchical organization
but allows the recomposition of certain aspects and the confirmation of others.
Moreover, it neither abolishes control nor those tensions associated with it. Instead,
it has distinct modalities of control, each of which generates quite specific ten-
sions. These are not so much an innovation in organization form but a reposi-
tioning of some classic questions.
If the future will be a projectified society, as Lundin and Söderholm (1998)
suggest, then it will not be one noticeably different from the pasts with which we
are familiar, other than in the loss of a traditional conception of career – it will
certainly retain elements of hierarchy even as it reconfigures them around new
project dependencies. Even as they eliminate central notions, such as bureaucratic
careers in favour of contingent work, and develop new forms of governmentality,
in essence, projects appear to be arenas for remote control rather than the
rehearsal of a post-bureaucratic future perfect.
NOTES
*We would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Carl Rhodes on an earlier draft of this
paper, as well as the comments of the reviewers.
[1] The full transcript of the interviews is available from the authors.
[2] We are indebted to Carl Rhodes for his advice on story-telling research that helped frame the
methodological considerations reported in this and the previous paragraph.
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